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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of equity has the power to issue interlocutory orders for the protec-
tion of an asserted lien, such orders must be auxiliary to the right
to foreclose the lien." Under the Prudence decision it was made
clear that if the mortgage had provided for relinquishment of posses-
sion on default or for the payment of rent then the power to fix
occupational rent pending the foreclosure action would have been
created. In the absence of such provision the power could not exist.
It seems to me that the language of the mortgage was quite clear.2 7
One must merely bear in mind that a receiver's possession for the
purpose of preserving the mortgage security does not include within
it the right to collect rents when none in fact accrue. His right is
to collect whatever rents the mortgaged premises yield. That right
comes from the language of the mortgage only. To grant the re-
ceiver greater rights would be to "accord the mortgagee rights be-
yond the stipulations of the mortgage" in direct violation of the
Prudence decision.
There is no statutory authority for holding that a mortgagor
in possession may be evicted from the mortgaged premises prior to
a sale under a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The right of pos-
session given to a receiver is incidental to the purpose for which the
receiver is appointed, namely, the collection of the rents and profits.
Actual possession being in one having the right of possession in-
herent in his ownership, no right of possession exists which may be
conferred upon a receiver. To prevent the mortgagee from becom-
ing possessory owner, equity will not compel the owner to pay occu-
pational rent unless it is specifically contracted so to do. Thus, the
decision in this case, in conformity with former decisions, reaches
a definite conclusion and lays down the rule of law for similar
situations in the future.
BEATRicE R. RAPOPORT.
THE MINNE SOTA MORTGAGE CASE.
The present day has brought to this country conditions that
never confronted the founders of our country and, it might be safely
stated, never came within the purview of their great vision. It is a
period in which the very foundations of the nation are being shaken.
We all know that we are in the midst of a great economic depression
which has brought with it great social questions. How have the
states attempted to meet the situation?
One of the methods employed by the legislatures of the various
states 1 is the enactment of statutes granting temporary relief to
" See supra note 25.
'Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
NOTES AND COMMENT
debtors. Such an enactment is designated a "moratory statute," which
is a statute granting a "moratorium." A moratorium may be defined
as a period during which an obligor has a legal right to delay meeting
an obligation.2  Legislation of this type, which suspends or delays
the creditor's right to enforce his remedy against the debtor at
maturity, when applied to existing contracts, has heretofore been
held unconstitutional, as being an impairment of the obligations of a
contract.3
Still, a great number of the states have enacted statutes which
have for their purpose the extension of the period of redemption
from mortgage foreclosures. 4 Perhaps the best known of these
statutes is the act passed by the Minnesota Legislature which is
called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law.5 In the preamble
thereto the legislature stated that an emergency existed.- In sub-
stance, the act authorized the district court of the county to extend
the period of redemption from foreclosure sales "for such additional
time as the Court may deem just and equitable" subject to certain
limitations. 7 In construing the constitutionality of the statute, the
court was presented with the question as to whether the provision for
temporary and conditional relief exceeded the power of the states by
reason of the "contract clause" of the Federal Constitution.
8
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the Blaisdell case,9 con-
ceded that the enactment was in conflict with the "contract clause."
But they upheld the validity of the act on the ground that said
statute was a proper exercise of the police power, in view of the
public emergency. From this decision the defendant in the action
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
There, Chief Justice Hughes, 10 writing for the majority of the
Court, in affirming the state court, refused to hold that the act
impaired the obligation of the contract and, hence, there was no
violation of the Constitutional provision.11 He contended that the
police power of the state was a power reserved; that in an emergency
(1920) 9 A. L. R. 6.
Ibid.
'Supra note 1.
'Laws of Minnesota (1933) c. 339.
'Stated low prices of commodities, consequent lowering of income and the
danger of a great majority of the people losing their homes because of an
inability to pay their interest on mortgages.1 Supra note 5, pt. 1, §4. Extension was to be granted, on notice to the
court, for an order determining the reasonable value of the income of the
property, or, if it has no income, the reasonable rental value, and directing the
mortgagor "to pay all or a reasonable part of such income or rental value, in
or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage indebtedness at
such times and in such manner as the court may direct."
'Art. 1, §10. "No state *** shall pass any law impairing the obligations
of contracts."
'Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Association, 249 N. W. 334, 893
(1933).
" Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934).
'Supra note 8.
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of the type that confronted the state such power was properly exer-
cised; and that all contracts made by an individual are not only
subject to the laws in being, at the time of the making of the contract,
but also to the proper use of this power of the state when invoked
under extraordinary circumstances.
In attempting any review of the cases in the Supreme Court
concerning the contract clause, it is necessary to bring out just what
is meant by the statement that "No state, * * * shall pass any law
impairing the obligations of contracts." 12 A contract is a compact
between two or more parties, and is either executed or executory.'3
And the obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to
perform their agreement. 14 But where to draw the line, or how to
limit the words "obligation of contracts" will be found a subject of
extreme difficulty. 15 Still, the clause must be construed in light of
its general intent and should not be subjected to a severe literal
interpretation.' 6
Early decisions held that a mere change of remedy did not
impair the obligation. 17 But if said acts so change the nature and
extent of existing remedies, as to prevent a recovery, or, to effect
seriously the value of it, they are unconstitutional.' 8 This Court has
held that a stay law, similar to the Minnesota law, violates the con-
stitutional prohibition inasmuch as it impairs the obligations of
existing contracts. 19
We have seen that an act that merely effects the remedy is not
unconstitutional. Let us see whether the police power of the state
gives to it authority to go further.
The police power of the state embraces the protection of the
lives, health and property of citizens, the maintenance of good order,
and the preservation of good morals.20  Such power is one that is
reserved to the states; emergency does not create it.2' And the use
of this power is not unconstitutional, as impairing the obligations
of contracts, merely because it contravenes the provisions of a private
contract between individuals. 22 But the use thereof must be reasonable
2 Ibid.
" Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1810).
"Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827).
"'Supra note 13.
" "But to assign to contracts, universally, a literal purport, and to exact
for them a rigid literal fulfilment, could not have been the intent of the Con-
stitution. It is repelled by a hundred examples. Societies exercise a positive
control as well over the inception, construction, and fulfilment of contracts, as
over the form and measure of relief." Supra note 14, at 286.
"7Supra note 14; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819).
"Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1823).
"Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 507 (U. S. 1843) ; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163
U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1895).
'°Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357 (1885).
'Supra note 10.
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 472, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905); Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529 (1908);
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and have a reasonable connection to the public welfare.2 3 The extent
of the police power is not unalterable, but may be modified to fit
changed conditions, as necessities dictate; 24 and the state has a wide
discretion in the use thereof.235 And the state cannot alien such power
even by express grant.
26
In dealing with contracts the Court has said that contracts
involved must be "affected with the public interest." 27 And circum-
stances may so change in time and space as to clothe with a public
interest what formerly was a matter of merely private concern.28
Because of the widespread distress and the number of homes and
people involved, the contracts affected here are clothed with the
public interest. 29 And being affected with the public interest, the
state in the legitimate exercise of its police power may interfere
with private contracts without coming into conflict with the Con-
stitution.3 0  The Court has said:
"It must suffice to satisfy the most sceptical or belated
investigator that the right of private contract must yield to
the exigencies of the public welfare when determined in an
appropriate manner by the authority of the State." 31
Summing up, it may be stated that private contracts are subject
to the exercise of the police power, and the exercise of the said
power does not impair the obligations of the contract, if
(1) the contract under consideration is affected with the
public interest; 32
(2) there is an emergency to justify the use thereof; 3
(3) such use is reasonable and the method adopted is rea-
sonably directed toward the end to be attained; 34
(4) such legislation is temporary.3 5
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct.
364 (1914).
'Bloch v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920) ; Penn Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158 (1922) ; Society of Sisters v. Pierce,
268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 511 (1925).
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923).
Weller v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 319, 45 Sup. Ct. 556 (1925).
'Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 (U. S. 1830); West River
Bridge v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (U. S. 1848).
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; German Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914).
'Brown v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921); Levy v.
Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289 (1921).
'Supra note 10.
'Ibid.
' Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp., 248 U. S. 372,
39 Sup. Ct. 117 (1919).
-Supra note 6.
'Supra note 10.
' Supra note 23.
'Supra note 10.
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And all contracts are made in subordination to the future exercise
of the police power of the state when the above conditions are
present.3 6
In conclusion, it may be said that in the present case the Court
has been carrying out the prevailing tendency when confronted with
great social questions. They believe that the State itself is the best
judge of what measures are necessary to preserve its existence.3 7 To
foretell future decisions of the Court, from this case, in regard to the
New Deal legislation is a difficult matter as the temporary feature of
the statute is emphasized 38 and a great deal of the Rooseveltian poli-
cies are to be permanent. Still, the upholding of temporary legislation
has previously given the Court an opening in order to take up new
and permanent legislation.3 9 All that may be said, at present, is that
the Court is sensitive to the great social and economic questions con-
fronting the country and it appears that they will attempt to uphold
all new legislation unless it is positively unconstitutional.
JOHN BENNETT.
Ibid.
'Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1869) ; Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall.
457 (U. S. 1870); Julliard v. Greeman, 110 U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (1884).
